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THE THEOLOGICAL ORTHODOXY OF
BERKELEY'S IMMATERIALISM
James S. Spiegel

Ever since George Berkeley first published Principles of Human Knowledge
his metaphysics has been opposed by, among others, some Christian
philosophers who allege that his ideas fly in the face of orthodox Christian
belief. The irony is that Berkeley's entire professional career is marked by
an unwavering commitment to demonstrating the reasonableness of the
Christian faith. In fact, Berkeley's immaterialist metaphysical system can be
seen as an apologetic device. In this paper, I inquire into the question
whether Berkeley's immaterialist metaphysics is congruent with the
Christian scriptures. I conclude that not only are Berkeley's principles consistent with scripture, a case can be made for the claim that certain biblical
passages actually recommend his brand of immaterialism.

1. Introduction
It is well known that the chief end of Berkeley's philosophical labors was

to defend the Christian religion. He says as much in the closing section
of the Principles, where he states that that work was calculated to "better
dispose [his readers] to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the
Gospel, which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of
human nature." l This being Berkeley's aim, it is no surprise that he is
careful to insist that his metaphysics is fully consistent with biblical principles. Indeed, in the Philosophical Commentaries, he proclaims "there is
nothing in Scripture that can possibly be wrested against me, but, perhaps, many things for me." 2 Here Berkeley's claim is two-fold. On the
one hand, he boldly asserts that his immaterialism implies nothing
which in any way contradicts scripture; on the other hand, he suggests
that in scripture there are to be found some passages which in fact favor
his immaterialism. For the sake of brevity, let us call the above two
claims Berkeley's "consistency" thesis and the "endorsement" thesis,
respectively. In this paper I shall assess these two theses, investigating,
first, Berkeley's defense of the biblical soundness of his immaterialism
and, second, the degree to which, if at all, his immaterialism is recommended by scripture.
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II. Berkeley's Immaterialism and the Consistency Thesis

Before proceeding to an examination of these two theses, let us
review the essential features of Berkeley's metaphysics which earn him
the title "immaterialist" and which his Christian opponents have on
occasion found offensive. The central thesis of Berkeley's system is the
principle esse est percipi aut percipere (to be is to be perceived or to perceive). Nothing which is not itself a mind exists independently of perception by some mind. In the Principles Berkeley arrives at this conclusion by arguing as follows. Since an object is nothing more than a collection of sensible qualities, and sensible qualities are ideas, an object is just
a collection of ideas. Now since ideas are mind dependent, existing only
when perceived, it follows that objects exist only when perceived. Their
esse is percipi. In Berkeley's ontology, then, there are two categories of
being: minds and ideas. There exist only ideas perceived and minds
perceiving them. Ideas are entirely passive, having "nothing of power
or agency included in them," while minds are "simple, undivided,
active substance[sl.'" Only mind possesses the power to produce and
perceive ideas. Insofar as it does the former it is called will; as it does the
latter it is called the understanding.
Implicit in Berkeley's principle that to be is to be perceived is a denial
of material substance, the inert, qualitiless "1 know not what" of which
Locke spoke and in which, according to him, all of the sensible qualities
of bodies subsist. 4 This doctrine is repudiated by Berkeley as unintelligible, since it is impossible to conceive of something which is unperceived,
and Locke's material substance, itself possessing no sensible qualities, is
unperceivable. These are, in a nutshell, Berkeley's philosophical reasons
for rejecting material substance. But, as we shall see in evaluating his
"consistency" thesis, his objections are not entirely philosophical but
theological as well.
Berkeley's "consistency" thesis, once again, is that his immaterialism
in no way implies anything which is inconsistent with scripture. I want
now to explore those doctrines or issues which the orthodox Christian
might think to be threatened by a Berkeleyan metaphysics. That is, I
shall discuss those issues where inconsistency between Berkeley's
immaterialism and scripture might be (and in some cases has been)
alleged.
In both the Principles and the Dialogues Berkeley anticipates objections
from scripture. In the former he proposes the objection that although no
rational demonstration of the existence of bodies can be made
the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as will sufficiently
convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist, and
are something more than mere ideas, there being in Holy Writ
innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of
timber and stone, mountains and dYers, and cities, and human
bodies. 5
Berkeley's reply, of course, is to deny that his principles in any way
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conflict with the scriptures or "the right use and significance of language." He is prepared to abide by the "vulgar acceptation" of such
words such as "timber", "stone", "body", etc. which denote tangible
objects and to distinguish between real and imaginary objects. And,
reiterating his central thesis, he reminds us that it is only "matter", as
some philosophers use the term, which he denies. In the Dialogues,
through Philonous, he presents us with this challenge:
As for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to shew where
Moses makes any mention of them; and if they should be mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be
incumbent upon you to show those words were not taken in the
vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the
philosophic acceptation, for Matter, or an unknown quiddity,
with an absolute existence. 6
Until then, Berkeley urges, the authority of the scriptures is irrelevant to
the discussion, for they are neutral on the issue of material substance. In
this way Berkeley shifts the burden of proof onto the matterist, convinced
that he has already fully demonstrated the truth of esse est percipi aut
percipere. But with regard to the propriety of God's use of material substance, Berkeley has yet another argument-from the principle of parsimony. In section 61 of the Principles he argues that the use of material
substance in creating the world would be unnecessary and superfluous
for an omnipotent deity. That is, Berkeley in effect asks, why should God
use material substance in doing that which "might have been effected by
the mere command of His will without all that apparatus"? To posit the
existence of matter, then, when God can accomplish all that he has
accomplished without it, is to violate Ockham's razor (or, at least, the theological principle that a being of perfect wisdom and power will always
effect his ends by the simplest and most expeditious means). The existence and operations of the universe are entirely explicable by God's will
and are needlessly explained with the addition of corporeal substance.
Theologically Berkeley considers the doctrine equally repugnant,
because it implies that "God has created innumerable beings that are
entirely useless and serve no manner of purpose."7 Belief in material
substance, then, amounts to the highest irreverence, for it suggests
divine frivolity in the creation of the physical world.
A second potential objection from scripture pertains to Berkeley's
doctrine of mind or spirit. His view, we will recall, is that there exist
only two kinds of things, spirits and ideas, or respectively, perceiving
subjects and that which is perceived. So, Berkeley tells us, we have no
idea of spirit. Now the problem is this. The Old and New Testaments,
especially the latter, are replete with hundreds of discussions of and references to the human soul or spirit which clearly presuppose that we
have some ideas of these entities. Numerous particular attributes are
predicated of the human soul or spirit, for example, that it can be
"downcast,'" "steadfast,"" "broken,"Hl "joyful,"" "contrite,"12 "lowly,"U
and "strong." I.
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How is Berkeley's professed ontology to be reconciled with this biblical language? He seems to have glimpsed the seriousness of the problem, for he deals with the matter explicitly in the Principles as follows.
Spirit, being an active substance which perceives, cannot itself be perceived for this implies passivity, a characteristic of ideas only. He says
of spirit that it is an active being. So "there can be no idea formed of a
soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot
represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts."15
Therefore, spirit "cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects
which it produces." l " Berkeley's position here in no way precludes him
from describing spirits using the same sorts of ascriptions employed by
the psalmists noted above, for these do not require the having of an idea
of spirit, in the strict sense.
The technical distinction Berkeley makes in this context in order to
allow for knowledge of spirit is between "ideational" and "notional"
knowledge. He writes, "We may be said to have some knowledge or
notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict
sense we have not ideas."I? Unfortunately, Berkeley says little more in
the way of explicating this distinction." This much we know, that
notional knowledge has an active being as its object rather than a passive being, which is the object of ideational knowledge. Furthermore,
the object of notional knowledge is perceived indirectly, through its
effects, whereas the object of ideational knowledge is directly perceived. 19 It seems that Berkeley is suggesting that notional knowledge is
best (or only) understood as knowledge which is non-ideational. At any
rate, his doctrine of notions, cryptic though it is, is certainly motivated
by his concern to preserve the possibility of genuine knowledge of spirits, which in turn can be seen as an attempt to reconcile his immaterialism with the basic scriptural presumption of this possibility.2!1
A third objection from scripture comes from Berkeley's associate
Samuel Johnson. He argues that given Berkeley's view of bodies as collections of ideas the perception of which is not really dependent upon
sense organs, the doctrine of bodily resurrection seems to be undermined, since upon death it is conceivable that "we should still be attended with the same ideas of bodies as we have now."21 The result is that
the wonder of physical resurrection is diminished by the ease of its
explicableness under Berkeley'S principles. Johnson's ironic conclusion
is that immaterialist metaphysics explains too much and that therefore
Berkeley'S ontology "seems to have no place for any resurrection at all,
at least in the sense that word seems to bear in St. John 5:28, 29."22
Berkeley's reply to Johnson is that his principles imply no exotic view
of bodily death and resurrection but that they may be conceived as easily with as without corporeal substance. He writes, "it seems very easy
to conceive the soul to exist in a separate state ... and to exercise herself on
new ideas, without the intervention of these tangible things we call bodies."23 Berkeley's response here is again indicative of his assumption
that the burden of proof is not upon him to show the consistency of his
principles with the doctrine of bodily resurrection but rather rests upon
critics such as Johnson to demonstrate their inconsistency." However, in
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replying as he does Berkeley focuses on the possibility of disembodied
existence rather than on the possibility of physical resurrection, and the
former does not imply the latter. But since Berkeley does not deny the
existence of bodies in the usual sense of the term, it is not clear from
Johnson's objection why this should be a particularly troublesome point
for Berkeley. For as Berkeley reminds Johnson, it is sufficient for him to
account for physical resurrection that "we allow sensible bodies, i.e.
such as are immediately perceived by sight and touch; the existence of
which I am so far from questioning ... "25 Now it might be the case that
Johnson's point rather is that Berkeley cannot adequately distinguish
between physical resurrection and disembodied existence. But if this is
his point then, again, Berkeley's reply is appropriate when he describes
the disembodied state as a condition in which the soul perceives without
the intervention of sense organs.
A fourth potential source of contention between Berkeley and his theologically orthodox 2t' critics concerns the matter of common sense. In his
notebooks Berkeley makes the following candid remark which many
commentators have since found incredible, or at least paradoxical, considering the novelty of his metaphysics: "All things in the Scripture w ch
side with the Vulgar against the Learned side with me also. I side in all
things with the Mob."27 Later, through Philonous in the Dialugues, this
claim is uncompromised. He declares "I am content, Hylas, to appeal to
the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion." 2S
Whether in fact Berkeley is properly considered a defender of common sense is still an open question and an issue which is today widely
disputed. Commentators such as Luce, Jessop, Grayling, and Pappas
have argued in defense of this claim, while Bennett, Pitcher, and Tipton
among others have maintained that Berkeleyan immaterialism opposes
common sense. Because of the complexity of this issue I will refrain
from entering into this debate here. Nor do I believe that demonstrating
Berkeley's metaphysics to be consistent with common sense is necessary
in order to vindicate it against the charge of theological heterodoxy. Our
present concern is to evaluate immaterialism in light of scripture, not to
determine whether it is amenable to all the common sense convictions of
ordinary folk. Our focus, then, is restricted only to the first claim
Berkeley makes in entry 405 of his notebooks: "All things in the
Scripture w ch side with the Vulgar against the Learned side with me
also." The question as to whether Berkeley'S subsequent claim is correct,
that he does "side in all things with the mob," is outside the scope of this
paper. I should note, nevertheless, that I believe the claim that his
immaterialism is consistent with common sense to be defensible. 2"
In defending Berkeley'S first assertion in notebook entry 405, it is
important to make two observations. First, as has already been noted,
the scriptures and the Genesis story in particular are neutral on the topic
of material substance. The biblical writers simply do not take a clear
side on the issue (though, as I shall try to show later, some passages
seem to suggest a Berkeleyan immaterialism). Thus, even if one concedes that belief in corporeal substance is commonsensical, immaterialism remains unthreatened until it is also shown that the scriptural posi-
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tion supports this conviction, a claim that Berkeley defies his antagonists
to justify.
Someone, of course, might object that although the scriptures make
no explicit reference to matter, their consistent support of common sense
generally serves as an indirect defense of realism (i.e., the thesis that [al
the objects we seem to perceive are real and [bl objects continue to exist
when not perceived). Immaterialism is, in contrast, an esoteric doctrine,
not read ily comprehended, let alone accepted, by ordinary folk.
Therefore, the scriptures implicitly side with the vulgar against Berkeley
on the question of corporeal substance. This objection leads us to the
second observation, namely that scripture itself does not consistently
side with common sense. Quite the contrary, the Bible is replete with
stories, doctrines, and moral rules which fly in the face of common
sense. Historical accounts of abominable Egyptian plagues, partings of
the Red Sea and Jordan river, spontaneously crumbled city walls at
Jericho, and scores of miracles; metaphysical tenets of a triune godhead,
divine incarnation, and justification by faith; and moral imperatives
such as "love your enemies" and "bless those who curse you", to sample
just a few, are admittedly opposed to common sense beliefs.
Theologically sensitive rivals of Berkeleyan immaterialism who base
their critique on common sense are wont to overlook this crucial consideration. The point here is that even if it is granted that matterism has
common sense as an advocate, this fact alone does not show that it is
supported by scripture. Immaterialism, as it turns out, just might be one
of the many non-commonsensical doctrines which is either allowed by
or, as I shall suggest, actually recommended by the scriptures.
The final, and perhaps most serious, objection to Berkeley's immaterialism I want to address regards the problem of evil. By all indications it
is a complaint which Berkeley himself took very seriously, for he
addresses the matter in several of his works. Let us look to the Principles
first where, in his typical fashion, he states the objection both convincingly and eloquently:
... monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains
failing in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the
like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is
not immediately actuated and superintended by a spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness.3()
What Berkeley outlines here is the problem of "natural" evil, as distinct from the problem of moral evil. To this objection Berkeley offers in
reply the Leibnizian "aesthetic" theodicy.'1 "Blemishes and defects of
nature," he asserts, serve to contribute to the beauty and goodness of the
whole just as in a painting shadows are necessary to complement the
brighter parts. 32 But since we are finite beings we are able to glimpse but
a small portion of the whole, whereupon we impugn God on the basis of
our ignorance.
In the Dialogues, Berkeley again treats the problem of evil, but this time
the subject is moral evil rather than natural evil. With regard to immoral
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actions performed by human beings he notes first that "the imputation of
guilt is the same, whether a person commits such an action with or without
an instrument," where in this context the "instrument" on the matterist's
account is understood to be material substance. In this way, Berkeley argues
that his immaterialism is, for good or ill, on equal footing with realism when
it comes to the problem of moral evil. If given his principles the benevolence
of God must be denied because of the presence of moral evil in the world,
then the same follows for the philosopher who assumes the principles of
matterism. Interposing material substance between God and human misconduct provides no buffer against divine responsibility. Just as a murderer
is equally culpable for his act whether he uses a gun or his fist, God is culpable (if culpable at all) for natural evil whether or not he created the world
using corporeal substance. Thus, Berkeley's intention here is simply to show
that any theodicy which works here for the matterist works equally well for
the immaterialist. There is no difference between them on this issue.
But Berkeley has an additional reply. He writes,
sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical
action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from
the laws of reason and religion .... therefore ... the making God an
immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the
Author of sin. 33
However, one might object, to cause such action is tantamount to willing
it. For God, to cause an event is to will it, since he presumably knows
what he is doing whenever he undertakes an action. Thus, it seems, the
distinction Berkeley draws here fails to exonerate God from responsibility for human sin, for obviously God must will or intend whatever he
brings to pass. He does not ordain blindly.
Berkeley does indeed face a serious problem here. However, as with
the objection above, it is not immaterialism specifically which is indicted
here but the more general doctrine of the immediate providence of God.
Berkeley's principles place him squarely within a much larger tradition
of Christian theology that affirms the divine foreordination of all things.
Anyone within this tradition, including those of the matterist stripe, must
grapple with the thorny problem of reconciling divine determinism,
human responsibility, and the goodness of God. There is much more to
be said (and has been said) about this issue, but this is not the place for it.
The point here is that Berkeley's immaterialist metaphysics does not subject him to any more formidable problem of evil than that which confronts certain other matterists. For both the task of forging a satisfactory
theodicy in light of the sovereignty of God is equally onerous.

III. The Endorsement Thesis and Scriptural Recommendations
of Berkeley's Immaterialism
Now that we have shown how Berkeley deflects criticism of his system for theological impropriety, let us look into his bolder "endorsement" thesis which maintains, we will recall, that the scriptures actually
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testify in behalf of his metaphysics. Although, as we have seen,
Berkeley offered repeated defenses of the "consistency" thesis, he was
not so explicit in his support of the "endorsement" thesis. Rather, he
was mostly content with merely appending to his arguments biblical
texts, leaving to the reader the task of embellishing a specific application. His favorite passage is found in the book of Acts where the apostle
Paul, speaking at a meeting on Mars Hill, remarks that in God "we live
and move and have our being."34 (The context of this passage is especially noteworthy, considering that the audience of Paul's discourse very
likely included Stoic and Epicurean philosophers.) But what exactly is
the significance of this passage as it pertains to Berkeley's immaterialism? Why is he so confident that it is relevant to, let alone that it serves
to bolster, his position? The answer becomes clear when we note a particular implication of his denial of material substance. Since sensible
qualities do not inhere in matter, their subsistence can only be explained
by the divine mind. The world has no existence independent of a perceiving spirit but continues to exist only because God perceives it. Thus,
a notion entertained by Descartes three quarters of a century earlier35
Berkeley also defends as true, asserting that "the divine conservation of
things is equipollent to, and in fact, the same thing with a continued
repeated creation; in a word, that conservation and creation differ only
in the terminus a quo."'"
If one carefully examines the creation account given in the book of
Genesis, I believe there is to be found there a possible recommendation
of Berkeley's brand of immaterialism. But before doing so, I want to
spell out in greater detail the precise relationship between God and the
world which is entailed by a Berkeleyan metaphysics.
But let me first briefly characterize the theologically conscious matterist interpretation of the Genesis creation account, specifically the sort of
narrative which Hylas might have provided had he obliged when
Philonous pressed him for such an explanation, saying "as for solid corporeal substances, 1 desire you to shew where Moses makes any mention of them."37 Hylas, as it turns out, offers no such evidence, nor does
he bother to present even the contours of an interpretation of the creation story from the perspective of a matterist. However, we might
imagine that it would go something like this: Tn the beginning God created matter, solid corporeal substance, which he subsequently formed
into various shapes, e.g. the earth, sun, moon, living creatures, and so
on. Of course, his creation of matter and his giving it particular forms
need not to have been temporally distinct acts, but they are at least conceptually distinct.
It is important to note that on the matterist account we really have no
conception as to how God created matter ex nilrilo. We only know that
he did so. This is a metaphysical mystery to us finite beings. Moreover,
there is nothing in human experience analogous to what God did in creation. It is true, human beings do create objects in a sense, but our creativity is more precisely a reformation or modification of objects that
already exist. What we make is always out of pre-existing material.
This is not the case with God's creative acts, however, for he requires no
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pre-existing material. He created out of nothing.
Now on the matterist conception the existence of the world independently of the perception of any particular spirit, including God, is conceivable, even granting God's initial creation of the world. 3s
Nonetheless, a theologically sensitive matterist such as Hylas would
insist the world is ruled by God, for it is governed by his laws, i.e., the
laws of nature. In fashioning the world the creator built into it certain
fixed, physical principles such as the laws of thermodynamics, the ideal
gas law, the laws of gravity, inertia, action and reaction, etc. These
insure that the physical world remains uniform, which in turn works to
the benefit of God's creatures, for we learn what to expect and hence are
better equipped to get along in the world. Still, despite the uniformity of
nature, God does intervene miraculously at times, suspending or holding in abeyance some law or laws of nature, to perform a deed to assist
his creatures, such as parting the Red Sea or transforming a staff into a
snake.
Now having looked at a matterist understanding of the Mosaic creation account and God's continued governance of the cosmos, let us see
what Berkeley has to say about these things. In the third Dialogue Hylas
objects as follows to Philonous' principles:
The scripture account of the creation is what appears to me
utterly irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of ideas? No certainly, but of things,
of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles
to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with yoU. 39
In the face of this challenge Philonous makes a distinction between two
senses of the word "ideas". What Philonous does not intend by this term
when speaking of the created order is "fictions" or "fancies of the mind".
Instead, he understands the proper denotation of "ideas" to be "immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things which cannot exist
unperceived, or out of a mind"'o Yet, he reminds Hylas that in everyday
parlance sense objects are called "things" rather than "ideas". Hence,
Philonous is able to conclude that in creation God made real things. Thus
having defended his allegiance to the "vulgar acceptation" of the Genesis
creation account, Philonous takes the offensive, noting that neither Moses
nor any other inspired writer refers to "solid corporeal substance," or
matter in its philosophic sense, as an "unknown quiddity, with an
absolute existence." Therefore, Philonous concludes, his own principles
are no more repugnant to the Mosaic creation account than are those of
Hylas. Still Hylas is unmoved and presses him for a fuller explanation.
Of course, Philonous is happy to comply with his request:
When things are said to begin or end their existence we do not
mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are
eternally known to God, or, which is the same thing, have an
eternal existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a divine decree of God, perceptible
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to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with
respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic
account of the creation, I understand that the several parts of the
world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed
with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they
were in truth perceived by them. This is the literal obvious
sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture . 41
There are then two kinds of divine ideas: (1) those which are eternal
archetypes existing solely in the mind of God and (2) those which are
temporal and relative ectypes, perceived not only by the mind of God
but by other spirits as well."' The former may be said to be "private"
with regard to the divine mind, while the latter are "public", that is,
accessible by minds other than God's. Now the act of creation, according to Philonous involves essentially making ectypes from certain divine
archetypes, or publicizing what once was private, known only to God.
About this Jonathan Dancy writes,
On this view, the world we live in, our world, is nothing other
than (part of) the contents of the mind of God. It is not just that
God causes us to have ideas like his; when we open our eyes
and see what is there, we are having ideas which are God's."
In short, the world consists of God's public ideas. And the creation of
the world was simply the process in which these ideas first became public, perceivable by finite spirits.
With this understanding of Berkeley's conception of the creation of
the world, we are prepared to look closely at the opening chapter of
Genesis to test his immaterialistic account of creation for ourselves.
Recall that in the narrative each of God's creative acts in the first chapter
of Genesis is prefaced with the phrase" And God said ..." This is the
refrain through the first twenty-four verses of Genesis. "And God
said ... ": "Let there be light" (v. 3), "Let there be an expanse between the
waters" (v. 6), "Let the water under the sky be gathered to one place and
let dry ground appear" (v. 9), "Let the land produce vegetation: seedbearing plants and trees ... " (v. 11), "Let there be lights in the expanse of
the sky to separate the day from the night..." (v. 14), "Let the water teem
with living creatures, and let birds fly above the earth ... " (v. 20), "Let the
land produce living creatures according to their kinds ... " (v. 24). At
every juncture of creation, God speaks things into existence. He creates
"by the word of his mouth". To use the vocabulary of immaterialism,
this is the means by which he makes his private, archetypal ideas public
and ectypal.
Now it is also plain from the Genesis story that we as human beings
mirror God's nature in some significant way: "So God created man in
his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he
created them."44 When one considers the mystery and superlativeness of
the divine being, this is a very cryptic passage indeed. What does it
mean to say that we are created in God's image? The full implications of
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this passage we will leave to theologians to debate, but in the present
context we are led to inquire as to whether we mirror the divine being in
the way Berkeley's creation account would seem to suggest we do. That
is, if it is the case from scripture that we are created in God's likeness
and it is also the case that God creates by speaking things into existence,
wherein lies any similarity between God and us on this score? Is there
evidence to suggest a Berkeleyan interpretation here? I would answer
this question in the affirmative and submit that we need look no further
than ordinary experience to find all the confirmation we need of
Berkeley's account. Let us simply examine the way we humans speak.
In short, to speak is, among other things, to make one's thoughts public.
For example, J am now thinking about my cat, Simon, specifically that
he has a bushy tail. This is a private thought of mine to which no person
other than myself has access. But when I utter the words, say, "My cat,
Simon, has a bushy tail", I publicize these thoughts. They are still my
thoughts, in a sense, but having expressed them in audible words other
persons may become privy to them. I have made my ideas public.
What I am suggesting is that there is a fruitful analogy between the
manner in which God created the world and the ordinary human experience of sharing ideas through speech. God created, i.e., made his ideas
public, through the spoken word!5 Likewise, we who are made in his
image publicize our ideas by speaking. Hence, in this way Berkeley's
immaterialist interpretation of the Genesis story of creation offers us a
sense in which human beings are divine image bearers that the usual
matterist conception does not!6
Let me draw out the analogy in further detail. First, speaking, we
should note, is not necessarily tantamount to making one's ideas known
to another mind but rather only to make them perceivable to or accessible by some other mind (at least in principle). When I say "My cat,
Simon, has a bushy tail" there mayor may not be anyone else within
earshot to hear my utterance and so to access my verbalized ideas. But if
someone who understands English were present, they would hear me
and, hence, perceive those thoughts of mine which Thad just made public. This sort of state of affairs in human speaking parallels Berkeley's
account of unperceived objects when he writes, for example, "The table I
write on I say exists, that is J see and feel it; and if I were out of my study
r should say it existed-meaning thereby that if J was in my study I
might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it."4?
Thus, there need not actually be some finite mind now perceiving my
desk for me to be able to say properly that it now exists. Similarly, when
I utter some statement when no one else is present to hear me, it is nevertheless the case that I have made my thoughts public, for if someone
had been listening, he or she would have perceived my objectified ideas.
Both of these cases are comparable to the Genesis creation account insofar as we may say properly that God made his ideas public even if there
were no other spirits present to perceive his objectified ideas, for if some
being, say, an angel, were present it would have perceived them. Notice
as well that whatever oddity or awkwardness there is in saying that
God's unperceived but perceivable ideas (to finite minds) are nonethe-
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less public, it is equally odd or awkward to refer to our spoken but
unheard (except by ourselves) words as nonetheless public. In either
case, this awkwardness might be thought to reveal a limitation to the
account. Consequently, even with regard to the potential weakness of
these accounts, there seems to be an analogy between human speaking
and divine creation.
I should note in passing that I do not without good reason use the
terms "publicize" and "objectify" when speaking of God's ideas which
are perceived or perceivable. I do so to preserve what I believe is an
accurate rendering of Berkeley's construal of the creation account and to
avoid certain problems into which some commentators needlessly run.
Jonathan Dancy, for example, in the passage quoted earlier, is misleading, for he might be construed as suggesting that when God creates he
makes his ideas known to someone. We have seen that for Berkeley,
given his alternative conditions for existence, this is not necessarily the
case. If divine creation did entail for Berkeley that God makes his ideas
known to someone (as opposed to knowable), then the question arises
"who was there to perceive God's public ideas during creation?" From
a theological perspective, the best reply here for someone such as Dancy
is to appeal to the prior existence of angels. The creation of the world
might be understood as God's private ideas 48 becoming publicized to
some cherubim, seraphim, or other angelic being(s). This line of
response, however, is troubled with the further complication that it does
not account for the possibility, acknowledged by Berkeley, that the
world might have been created before any finite mind.
Thus far, then, Berkeley'S account of creation, if it occurred in time,
seems incomplete, or at least awkward. For if the Berkeleyan picture is
accurate, on what grounds can it be meaningfully said that at time T 1
prior to creation it was true while at time T2 it was false that were a
finite mind present it would have perceived something? Charles
McCracken has dealt incisively with this issue. I) In so doing, he adumbrates key passages from the Dialogues such as this:
[T]hings, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their
existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become
perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner
which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature. 50
and this one quoted earlier:
All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same
thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things,
before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence,
with respect to created minds. 51
According to McCracken, it is apparent from passages such as these
that the key to understanding Berkeley'S explanation as to how we are to
make sense of the problem identified above lies in God's decrees. Thus,
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McCracken says that
for Berkeley the creation of the visible world is identical with
God's freely making a certain decree: the decree, that is, that certain sense qualities will be perceived in a certain order and connection by such spirits as do exist, or that those qualities would
be perceived in that arrangement, were any spirits in existence. S"
Now such decrees, McCracken explains, differ from God's powers in
that the former involve an act of divine will, while the latter do not.
Divine decrees are to be understood as "ideas in the mind of God".
They are analogous to the "plan or program" of any human being who
determines in his mind what actions he will take, given certain contingencies.
Another analogy between human speaking and divine creation
according to the Berkeleyan account is revealed when we consider that
what a person says when he or she speaks tells us something about who
he or she is. Through verbal communication one displays his or her
intelligence, creativity, interests, moral convictions and so on. In short,
by listening to what a person says we can learn a great deal about him or
her. Similarly, for Berkeley, through observing the creator's visual language we are able to infer much about the author of the world. As
Philonous says in the second dialogue, "from the variety, order, and
manner of [sensible impressionsl I conclude the Author of them to be
wise, powerful, and good, beyond all comprehension."s3 Hence, for
Berkeley, inferring God's nature from his "language" (i.e., the created
world) is in principle done in the same way we infer the attributes of
other persons from the things they say. The inferrability of God's nature
is suggested in various places in scripture. For instance, the psalmist
proclaims that "the heavens declare the glory of God."54 And Paul
writes: "Since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities-his
eternal power and divine nature--have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made ... "ss Biblical texts such as these are perfectly consonant with a Berkeleyan metaphysic which suggests the sort
of unmistakable nearness of God about which the psalmist and the apostle are so confident. This leads us to a further analogy.
The person who speaks controls and determines everything he or she
says. In the case of the "divine speaker", this is known as "providence",
the absolute and immediate control which the creator exercises over his
creation. Berkeley was careful to point out that the doctrine of providence is implied by his metaphysics, specifically his conception of the
world as a divine visual language. He explains:
This visual language proves, not a creator merely, but a provident governor, actually and intimately present, and attentive to
all our interests and motions, who watches over our conduct,
and takes care of our minutest actions and designs throughout
the whole course of our lives, informing, admonishing, and
directing incessantly, in a most evident and sensible manner. 50
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By all biblical accounts God is intimately related to, though ontologically distinct from, the world. 57 Furthermore, the creator is said to exercise complete dominion over his creation, a conviction evident in the
words of Jeremiah: "Who can speak and have it happen if the Lord has
not decreed it? Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that both
calamities and good things come?"58 (Note again the speech metaphor.)
In the book of Isaiah this same conviction is echoed by God himself
throllgh the prophet: "I form the light and create darkness, I bring prosperity and create disaster; I, the Lord, do all these things".5~ And the
apostle Paul proclaims that God "is before all things and in him all
things hold together"61l again suggesting the determination of all things
by God. 6 ! Divine foreknowledge of future events, a concomitant of the
deity's control over all things, also has its parallel in human experience.
God's knowledge of future events is similar to a person's knowledge of
the words he or she is prepared to speak. In both cases the agent has
decided privately what he or she will do publicly.
A fourth parallel between human and divine "speech" is to be found
in what Berkeley refers to as "divine conservation" or "constant creation.""" Since the world consists of God's public ideas, it must persist
only because he continues to publicize his thoughts. That is, unlike the
matterist who asserts that God can "step back" from his creation or
even, at least in principle, stop thinking about the world without its
ceasing to exist, since matter is mind independent, Berkeley must hold
that were God to cease perceiving the world, it would vanish altogether.
For apart from God there remains nothing, i.e. no material substratum,
to sustain nature.
The analogue to be found in human experience of divine conservation
of the world consists in the fact that if the interlocutor stops speaking,
the conversation ceases, for there are no new public ideas to access. Of
course previously accessed ideas may remain in the mind of the audience and these may continue to be accessible (in a sense) so long as they
are recalled, but they are not public in the way they were formerly, for
they are no longer accessible to new interlocutors, because there are no
more "new" sensible signs for them to perceive. Note that even here the
parallel with Berkeley's divine discourse is preserved, for were God to
cease sustaining the sensible world, finite spirits might retain memories
of the sensed ideas even upon its vanishing, though they would have no
"new" sense impressions.
Another analogy between human and divine speech is pointed out by
Colin Turbayne. 63 Under Berkeleyan immaterialism, he observes, the
laws of nature are analogous to rules of grammar. In verbal communication we humans are constrained to abide by certain grammatical conventions, rules of syntax, punctuation, etc. In short, we must be consistent if we are to be intelligible and meaningful. Similarly God's ideas
(i.e., the phenomena of nature), if they are to be intelligible, must remain
consistent, operating in accordance with certain general rules.
Berkeley defines the laws of nature as "the set rules or established
methods wherein the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of
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sense."64 What we call nature's "laws" then are in actuality the sovereign will of God which remains constant and uniform for the welfare of
his creatures (except in the case of the miraculous where deviation from
the rule works to our benefit). As in the case of syntactical rules, then,
the laws of nature are conventional rather than necessary, being devised
solely for the effective communication between speaker and hearer. Just
as irregularity in linguistic forms would result in confusion among interlocutors, in the absence of uniformity in nature "we should be all in
uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to
manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born."'"
Sixthly, and lastly, the immaterialist's linguistic metaphor provides
an analogue in human experience to God's creation ex nlhi/o. When we
speak we make our thoughts public which were themselves created out
of nothing. This is probably Berkeley's thinking when he writes, "Why
may we not conceive it possible for God to create out of Nothing.
Certainly we our selves create in some wise whenever we imagine."66
On Berkeley'S principles, then, the verbal expression of our thoughts as
well as thinking itself are some very familiar ways in which humans
mirror God's creation of the world out of nothing. 67
Before closing, I want to make a side observation about an additional
point of interest in Berkeley'S thought from the perspective of Christian
orthodoxy. AD. Ritchie has called the eighteenth century "the period of
maximum substance idolatry" where the deity was demoted from the
position of creator to a mere artificer of pre-existing material.'8 Whether
or not this estimation of the centrality of substance in the metaphysics of
the age is overstated, Berkeley certainly seems to have sensed the
urgency in eradicating the notion of corporeal substance from cosmology. In sections 92-96 of the Principles Berkeley asserts that the doctrine
of matter has served as the principle support for atheists, skeptics, fatalists, the irreligious, and the impious. Moreover, he maintains,
... on the same principle does idolatry likewise in all its various
forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and
stars, and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely
being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas, but rather address their homage to that
Eternal Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things. 6"
This passage represents Berkeley's turn from defender of the mere
theological consistency of immaterialism with scripture to the much
stronger contention that his metaphysical system is actually superior to
matterism theologically because of its avoidance of heretical implications. Berkeley mayor may not be correct in his claim that matterism
spawns idolatrous religious belief and practice, however the practical
effects, harmful or beneficial, of a metaphysical doctrine are not properlya philosophical consideration in judging its truth. But surely Berkeley
must have known this. So why does he bother to devote long sections of
his Principles and the Dialogues to the project of explaining how his
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immaterialism is amenable to scripture and how the practical effects of
its acceptance would edify adherents to the Christian religion? The
short answer is that he assumed his audience to be largely sympathetic,
though not necessarily devotees, to the faith and therefore likely to be
responsive to arguments based on points of primarily theological interest. This explanation accounts for the fact that Berkeley's chief motivations in even constructing his philosophical system were theological in
character.
Now to return to the issue at hand, does immaterialism really provide
a defense against idolatry? Berkeley was convinced to the point of near
dogma, and I believe part of the reason has already become evident in
the explication of his metaphysics above. Everything in the universe,
whatever its nature, is continually sustained by the deity, utterly dependent upon him for its existence. Therefore, to worship any created item
would amount to worshipping the ideas of the creator rather than the
creator himself. To understand this, Berkeley suggests, is sufficient to
discourage one from succumbing to the temptation. To realize the
omnipresence of God such that "in him we live and move and have our
being" is to conceive at once the worthiness of this being to be worshipped and the foolishness of preferring to worship some infinitely
inferior being. Substance ontology, on the other hand, allowing for the
mind-independence of objects, in no such way demands that God be
conceived as so intimately related to his creation and therefore permits
the mind to stray from God in its meditation on physical objects.
Something like this seems to be Berkeley's thinking. Whether he is correct is a question which might as well be left to empirical testing as to
philosophical disputation.

IV. Conclusion
To sum up, the linguistic metaphor plays a central role in Berkeley's
immaterialism and, as we have seen, its role is also significant in the
scriptures. My defense of Berkeley's "endorsement" thesis has consisted
largely in showing how his metaphysics acknowledges and exploits this
biblical convention. One of the objectives of this paper has been to argue
that Berkeleyan immaterialism enjoys at least as much and perhaps
more explanatory power than matterism when approaching key biblical
passages such as the Genesis account of creation. For the former is
much better prepared than the latter to attach a substantive, concrete
meaning to the speech imagery pervading the Old and New Testaments.
It seems to me the matterist's sole explanation for these expressions is
that they are entirely metaphorical. A Berkeleyan, on the other hand,
while acknowledging their metaphorical dimension, may also take these
expressions to some extent literally, counting them as veritable insights
into the nature of God as well as humans who on the Mosaic account are
made in his image.
Most of the philosophical problems facing the Christian theist, such
as the problems of evil and free wilt the logic of the nature of God, and
the authority of the Old and New Testaments, do still confront Berkeley.
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This paper ought not to be construed as claiming otherwise. What I
have tried to show here is that commitment to Berkeleyan immaterialism does not entail theological heterodoxy or heresy (at least concerning
the issues discussed in this paper). On the contrary, I have argued that
Berkeley's principles are perfectly compatible with orthodox Christian
theology and, furthermore, that they afford the believer conceptual tools
practical for deepening rather than distorting the "salutary truths of the
Gospel", a conclusion which would undoubtedly please a theologically
conservative Anglican so sensitive to heresy.
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